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Tyler v. Cain
121 S. Ct. 2478 (2001)
L Facts
In March 1975, Melvin Tyler ("Tyler") allegedlyshot and killed his twenty,
day -old daughter during a fight with his estranged girlfriend. A jury found Tyler
guilty of second-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on appeal.
Tyler filed five state petitions for post-conviction relief, which were denied. He
also filed a federal habeas petition, which was denied.'
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided Cage v Loussiana,2 after
which Tyler filed a sixth state post-conviction petition, claiming that the Cge
holding should apply retroactively to his case The state district court denied
relief, and the Supreme Court of Louisiana affirmed. Seeking to pursue his Cge
claim through a federal habeas corpus petition, Tyler moved the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Crcuit for permission to file a second habeas
corpus application. Such permission is required by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996 ("AEDPA").4 The Fifth Circuit found that
Tyler had made the requisite "prima facie showing" that his "claim relie[d] on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previouslyunavailable," and granted Tyler's motion,
thereby allowing him to file a habeas petition in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Louisiana.'
The district court held that Tyler was not entitled to collateral relief based
on the merits of his case. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, but held that the district
court erred in proceeding to the merits rather than dismissing the claim on the
grounds that Tyler had not shown that the "claim relie[d] on a new rule of
constitutional law, rrzde myazaiw to case on Aateral nuewby th Ste re Caa that
was previouslyunavailable." 6 The Fifth Circuit held that Tyler's petition must be
1. Tyler v. Cain, 121 S. Ct. 2478, 2480 (2001).
2. 498 U.S. 39 (1990).
3. T2I, 121 S. Ct. at 2480-81; swCage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 41 (1990) (holding that a
jury charge equating reasonable doubt with "grave uncertainty" and "actual substantial doubt"
suggested a higher degree of doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable-doubt
standard).
4. Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L No. 104-132, S 102, 110 Stat.
1214, 1217 (1996) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C S 2253(c) (Supp. V 1999)).
5. Trer, 121 S. Ct. at 2481.
6. Id at 2479 (emphasis in original); s-also28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
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denied because he "could not show that anySupreme Court decision render[ed]
the Cage decision retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review."7
II. Hdding
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth CGrcuit's decision
denying Tyler's federal habeas petition The Supreme Court held that, under
AEDPA, a new rule is "made retroactive to cases on collateral review" onlyif the
Supreme Court holds the new rule to be retroactively applicable.9 The Court
held that the new rule articulated in Qe had not been "made retroactive to cases
on collateral review by the Supreme Court" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C S
2244(b)(2)(A) 0
I. Am /A piiainia im V rzia
In Cag, the United States Supreme Court held that a jury instruction
violates Due Process if a reasonable juror is likelyto have interpreted the instruc-
tion to allow a finding of guilt without proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In his
second petition for federal habeas relief, Tyler claimed that one of the jury
instructions in his trial was substantively identical to the instruction condemned
in Cage.12 Tyler asserted that the age rule should be applied retroactively to his
case, and that his second petition for habeas corpus should be accepted."
Under AEDPA, if a prisoner asserts a claim that he has already raised in a
previous federal habeas petition, the claim must be dismissed." A petitioner's
claim that was not raised in a previous petition must also normallybe dismissed."
However, if the claim is predicated on "newly discovered facts that call into
question the accuracy of a guiltyverdict," the claim need not be dismissed. 6 The
other exception applies when the petitioner "shows" that the "claim relies on a
new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by
the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." 7 Tyler asserted that his
second habeas petition fell under this second exception.8
7. Id at 2481.
8. Id at 2485.
9. Id at 2482.
10. Id at 2483; se S 2244(b)(2)(A).
11. Cage v. Louisiana, 498 US. 39,41 (1990).
12. T*der, 121 S. QL at 2480.
13. Id at 2481.
14. Id at 2482; seealo28 US.C S 2244(b)(1) (Supp. V 1999).
15. T*ie, 121 S. QL at 2482.
16. Id at 2482; sealso 28 US.C S 2244(b)(2)(B) (Supp. V 1999).
17. Te, 121 S. Q. at 2482; se aso 28 U.S.C S 2244(b)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1999).
18. T*, 121 S. 0L at 2482.
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In order to obtain permission from a court of appeals to file a second
petition in district court, the applicant needs to make only a "prima fade show-
ing" that the petition satisfies the standard set forth under 28 U.S.C S
2244(b)(2) (A).19 However, in order to obtain relief in district court, the petitioner
must meet the higher burden of actually "showing" that the claim satisfies the
statutory standard. ° In order to meet this higher standard, the rule on which the
second claim relies must meet three qualifications: (1) it must be a "new rule" of
constitutional law;, (2) it must have been "made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court"; and (3) the claim must have been "previously
unavailable."" Both the State and Tyler agreed that Gzge created a "new rule"
that was "previouslyunavailable."22 However, the State argued that the Gage rule
had not been made retroactive by the Supreme Court to cases on collateral
review.
23
The Court interpreted the word "made" bylooking at its context and place
in the "'overall statutory scheme."'24 The Court explained that according to 28
U.S.C S 2244(b) (2) (A), a new rule maybe made retroactive to cases on collateral
review only by the Supreme Court." The Court stated that the "only way the
Supreme Court can, by itself [make a rule retroactive] is through a holding."26
Thus, the Court decided that "made" means "held."27 The Court further ex-
plained that it does not make "a rule retroactive when it merely establishes
principles of retroactivity and leaves the application of those principles to lower
courts." 2 Instead, the Court concluded that a new rule is "made retroactive to
cases on collateral review" onlywhen the Court actually holds the rule to be so.'
Although S 2244(b)(2)(A) uses the word "made," not "held," the Court found
that "Congress need not use the word 'held' to require as much.""
The Court decided that interpreting the word "made" to be a synonym for
"held" was necessary to implement AEDPA's collateral review structure.31
Under S 2244(b)(3), courts of appeals are allowed only thirty days to determine
whether a second application for habeas review makes a prima facie showing that
19. S 28 US.C S 2244(b)(3)(q (Supp. V 1999).
20. T&-, 121 S. Ct. at 2481.
21. Id at 2482 (quoting S 2244(b)(2)(A)).
22. Id
23. Id






30. Id at 2483; seWiliams v. Taylor, 529 US. 362,412 (2000) (holding that in 28 US.C S
2254(d)(1) the word "determined" means "held").
31. T*Ir, 121 S. CL at 2483.
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the application satisfies the heightened standard laid out in S 2244(b)(2)(A) . 2
The Court reasoned that this stringent time limit suggests that "the courts of
appeals do not have to ... determine questions of retroactivity in the first in-
stance," but must rather "simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroactiv-
ity."33
The Court found that while Cage held that the particular jury instruction
used in that case violated Due Process, it did not itself hold that its rule was
retroactive. 4 Tyler argued that a subsequent case, Su//iumv Lcuisiam,3' made the
Cage rule retroactive under the principles of Teague v Lam. 6 Under Teague, one
exception to the general rule of nonretroactivityis that a new rule maybe applied
retroactively if an infringement of the rule would "seriously diminish the likeli-
hood of obtaining an accurate conviction," or would "alter our understanding of
the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding."37
Tyler argued that the Cage rule fit within both prongs of the Targue exception."
Tyler contended that Su/itm found that a Cage error "fundamentallyundermines
the reliability of a trial's outcome."Y' Tyler also argued that "the central point of
Sul/izn is that a Cage error deprives a defendant of a bedrock element of proce-
dural fairness: the right to have the jury make the determination of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt."'
The Court rejected Tyler's argument that, through its holdings in Su=an
and Qage, the Court "made" the agze rule retroactive to cases on collateral
review.41 The Court found that, while Sufliun held that Cage error is structural
error, there "is no second case that held that all structural-error rules apply
retroactively."42 The Court similarly found that there was no second case that
held that "all structural-error rules fit within the... Teague exception."43 The
Court stated that "[c]liassifying an error as structural does not necessarilyalter our
32. Id at 2483; si 28 US.C S 2244(b)(3) (Supp. V 1999).
33. T*e, 121 S. Cc. at 2483.
34. Id
35. 508 US. 275 (1993).
36. TAr, 121 S. Ct. at 2483; seSullivan v. Louisiana, 508 US. 275, 281-82 (1993) (holding
that a Cag error is structurl and therefore always invalidates a conviction); swa/oTeague v. Lane,
489 US. 288, 311 (1989) (plurality opinion) (explaining that an exception to the general rule of
nonretroactivitywill be reserved for 'watershed rules of criminal procedure" that alter the under-
standing of "bedrock procedural elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular
conviction" (quoting Mackeyv. United States, 401 US. 667, 693 (1971) (Harla, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part))).
37. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 US. 227, 242 (1990) (citing Taewl 489 US. at 311).








understanding of these bedrock procedural elements. Nor can it be said that all
new rules relating to due process ... alter such understanding.""
The Court found that the G rule had not been "held retroactive to cases
on collateral review" by any of its prior holdings."' The Court also held that the
Tae exception for "watershed" rules did not necessarilydictate retroactivityin
this case.' The Court, stating that "[a]nystatement on Cag's retroactivitywould
be dictum," declined Tyler's invitation to make the Cg rule retroactive in his
case.47 The Court held that because the Court had not alreadymade Cage retroac-
tive, the district court was required to dismiss Tyler's second habeas petition.48
IV. Cb ndm
The Court found that Targe does not logically dictate that all structural-
error rules are "watershed" rules, thus mandating retroactivity. The Court also
found that AEDPA requires that in order for a new rule to be applied retroac-
tivelyon collateral review, the Supreme Court must have "made" the rule retroac-
tive.49 For purposes of interpretng AEDPA, the Supreme Court held that it
"ma[kes] something retroactive only through a Supreme Court holding.' The
Court found that neither G nor anysubsequent Supreme Court case explicitly
held the new rule articulated in Ca to be retroactive."'
Mythri A. Jayaraman
44. Id at 2484 n.7.
45. Id at 2484.
46. Id
47. Id at 2485.
48. Id at 2484; se 28 US.C S 2244(b)(4) (Supp. V 1999).
49. Tkr, 121 S. . at 2482.
50. Id
51. Id at 2483-84.
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